A reader asked me recently why Iraqis aren’t doing more to help U.S. soldiers catch the “bad guys.”

After all, to paraphrase President Bush’s Thanksgiving speech to the troops, Americans charged “hundreds of miles into the heart of Iraq (and paid) a bitter price in casualties (to) defeat a brutal dictator and liberate 25 million Iraqis.” So why aren’t the Iraqis helping us root out those whom Bush called “a band of thugs and assassins”?

Why is it that U.S. forces can’t acquire the necessary human intelligence to catch Saddam or defeat the “bad guys”?

One answer is the administration’s lack of a Sunni Strategy.

Most of the trouble has swirled around the so-called Sunni triangle, north and west of Baghdad, that is home to much of the 15 percent Sunni Arab minority who benefited most from Saddam’s despotic system. They led his military and special forces, staffed his intelligence services, and reaped top party jobs and lucrative contracts.

Many of the worst Saddam backers survived the war when Turkey refused to let U.S. troops sweep down from the north into the Sunni heartland. Senior Bush officials never anticipated this rejection – or its aftermath.

Thousands of Saddam fighters were able to fade away to the cities of the Sunni triangle. These Sunnis have everything to lose in a new system dominated by Kurds and the majority Shiite Muslims. They also have plenty of guns and cash left over from the Saddam era.

The clear postwar challenge was to formulate a strategy to isolate the Sunni bad guys. This required an effort to persuade most Sunnis that they had a future inside the new Iraq – and should reject the old guard. Instead, administration policy has inflamed broad Sunni opposition to U.S. troops.

I observed, on two trips to Iraq, that officials couldn’t seem to agree whether to woo or punish the Sunni population.

In May, U.S. officials abolished the Iraqi army, throwing thousands of Sunni officers with guns out of work without severance or pensions. Thousands of members of Saddam’s Baath Party were tossed out of jobs, even those who had to join for career reasons. These moves created a bitter constituency with motive to oppose occupation forces.

Some U.S. commanders understood the complicated challenge of wooing the Sunnis. Gen. David Petraeus, commander of the 101st Airborne in the northern city of Mosul, honed his nation-building skills in Bosnia and Kosovo. He reached out to Sunni tribal, religious and intellectual leaders, and until recently Mosul was relatively quiet.

Petraeus set up an employment agency for out-of-work soldiers and rehired university professors who had been fired because they were Baath Party members. He set strict rules for treatment of Iraqi civilians and required swift payment for damages to Iraqi homes or injuries to civilians. Instead of waiting for U.S. contractors to fix schools or factories – at inflated prices – he hired locals to do it, at a fraction of the cost.

But senior U.S. brass never drew a best-practices model from Petraeus’ example. Other U.S. divisions in the Sunni triangle kick in doors and take women in for questioning, creating a furor in tribal society. They bomb urban areas, and fire carelessly in civilian neighborhoods.

Notorious cases of civilian casualties in cities like Fallujah have poisoned relations with U.S. forces. They inspire radical Sunni clerics who urge youngsters to fight a jihad against the infidels. Those who cooperate with Americans are threatened or killed.

The uncertainty caused by this growing insurgency is destabilizing even oases like Mosul, where attacks on U.S. soldiers are increasing. Unemployment is still widespread in the city, and the insurgents can play on the anger this causes. At the worst possible moment, Gen. Petraeus has run out of discretionary cash for job-creation projects.

It’s past time – if not too late – for a Sunni Strategy that offers this fearful, angry segment of Iraqis a political and economic future. Otherwise, no one should expect much Sunni help in catching the bad guys.

Trudy Rubin is a columnist and editorial-board member for the Philadelphia Inquirer.

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