In the short time since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, that date has become a marker in American history, the beginning of a new era.
As a result of Sept. 11, we have gone to war in Asia, have changed our laws and have lost confidence in our safety. As a nation, we have become more cautious, more willing to sacrifice our unique freedom of movement across a continent in the hope of security. The particular grief that comes from war and mass death on one’s own soil, not felt in the United States since Pearl Harbor, continues three years later to bring tears and anger.
How do Europeans feel about this American tragedy? From my vantage point in Berlin, I see that Sept. 11 is also a milestone in European history. Like American newspapers, my Berlin paper on that day carried a photograph of Ground Zero and devoted most of the first three pages to articles about the years since then. One article headline seemed especially appropriate: “The Hole in Time.”
More concretely, a worldwide effort to increase security against terrorism parallels the legal and political reactions of the U.S. government. Heightened police visibility, fewer restrictions on state surveillance and a harsher attitude toward Muslims are now commonplace across Europe. Armed sky marshals are more common on many airlines. The purchase of “security products” across the world is estimated to cost $572 billion per year.
While it seems that Germans share both our sadness and our alarm, their analysis of the meaning of Sept. 11 is quite different. The German commentary on Sept. 11 illustrates the gulf that has developed between American and European politics over the past three years.
This less emotional and potentially more critical attitude is nowhere more obvious than in European judgments about American politics, especially American foreign policy. For a year after Sept. 11, much of the world stood with the United States in making war on the Taliban in Afghanistan.
German Chancellor Gerhard Schrder spoke for all Europeans when he promised “unlimited solidarity” with the United States. Since the decision to invade Iraq, however, the majority of our former allies, including many of our closest partners in NATO, have opposed our administration’s conclusions about the meaning of Sept. 11. Revelations about American torture of prisoners in Guantanamo and Baghdad have shocked the democratic world. The rejection of American foreign policy goes much deeper than political leaders: A recent survey of Europeans showed that about 80 percent would vote for John Kerry, indicating mainly their unhappiness with the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq and unwillingness to participate in various international agreements, such as the Kyoto Treaty.
While Americans focus on our pain from Sept. 11, Europeans have their own personal understanding of terror and death. Most prominent recently, Russia lost nearly 500 people in the last few months from Chechen terrorist attacks, with no end in sight. Italians and Germans fought with homegrown terrorists during the 1970s and 1980s, and the recent bombing in the Madrid train station affected Spanish elections.
Some Americans, especially the defenders of the Bush administration, have criticized French and German political leaders as weak, irrational, cowardly appeasers of terror. Yet the Russian government, which continues to object to the war in Iraq, sees the U.S. government as ambivalent in rejecting terror. Russian leaders are incensed that the U.S. government has been willing to meet with representatives of Shamil Bassajev, the Chechen rebel leader behind the most recent terrorist acts. American rejection of terrorism has always been mixed with international political maneuvering.
The United States supplied the Islamic rebels against Soviet domination in Afghanistan with weapons that later were turned against us, just as Saddam Hussein was once courted by American statesmen. Since the war in Chechnya weakens our potential superpower rival, Bassajev becomes a legitimate political actor. One should imagine American reaction to Vladimir Putin opening negotiations with one of Osama bin Laden’s lieutenants.
The highly charged atmosphere of the U.S. presidential campaign, combined with the constant reminders of how many Americans have been killed in Iraq, makes every comment about Sept. 11 into a partisan proclamation.
Outside of the United States, American policy in 2004 looks ominously different. Unjustified war against a sovereign state, torture of prisoners and inability to pacify Iraq have made the world less safe and the U.S. less worthy of respect. As we have exhibited our military supremacy, we are in danger of losing our moral standing. From this vantage point, the terrorists appear to have succeeded in weakening America.
Steve Hochstadt lives in Lewiston and teaches history at Bates College. He is temporarily teaching in Germany and can be reached at [email protected].
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