PARIS – An assistant attorney general believes that a Woodstock man’s civil suit over his arrest may have helped police.

The case “goes a long way toward establishing an officer’s immunity from civil suits,” said Assistant Attorney General William R. Fisher.

In the case, John Cox III of Woodstock was arrested by Maine Trooper John Hainey on May 9, 2001, on a charge of felony aggravated trafficking in a narcotic painkiller and furnishing scheduled drugs to a minor.

Before arresting Cox, Hainey consulted with Assistant District Attorney Richard Beauchesne in Paris, where it was determined that probable cause existed.

But, the case against Cox was dropped on June 20, 2001, because the probable cause could not be proven.

Cox then filed suit last year for false arrest against Hainey, claiming Hainey didn’t satisfy probable cause requirements.

But a U.S. District Court judge ruled that qualified immunity shielded Hainey from the suit.

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects public officials from civil liability, as long as their conduct doesn’t violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would have known about.

On Dec. 1, U.S. Court of Appeals Circuit Judge Bruce M. Selya agreed with the District Court judge.

“An objectively reasonable officer, standing in Hainey’s shoes, could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest (Cox) for the crime of aggravated furnishing of a Schedule W drug,” Selya said.

He said the doctrine draws a line that separates unconstitutional but objectively reasonable acts from obviously unconstitutional acts.

“Though Hainey’s judgment call may walk a thin line between probable cause and mere suspicion, it cannot be shrugged off as plainly incompetent,” he said.

Because Hainey took the precaution of reviewing the known facts with the local prosecutor, it bolstered the conclusion that Hainey’s actions were objectively reasonable, he stated.

But Cox, through his lawyer, Timothy Zerillo of Portland, argued that a police officer should not be able to insulate himself from liability for an erroneous determination simply because he obtained a prosecutor’s blessing to arrest on evidence that didn’t establish probable cause.

Selya agreed.

“A wave of the prosecutor’s wand cannot magically transform an unreasonable probable cause determination into a reasonable one. That is not to say, however, that a reviewing court must throw out the baby with the bath water,” he stated.

Selya said the consultation and the advice obtained should be factored into the circumstances in determining the officer’s entitlement to qualified immunity.

In considering the relevance of an officer’s pre-arrest consultation with a prosecutor, a reviewing court must determine whether the officer’s reliance on the prosecutor’s advice was objectively reasonable, Selya stated.

“A reasonably careful police officer might be inclined to consult with the district attorney. If you do, you will be more than likely found to be immune from lawsuits in a federal civil rights case of this type,” Fisher said.