Constraining North Korea’s nuclear ambitions will require much more than the written agreement released Monday by the six nations taking part in disarmament negotiations.
Essentially, after three years of sharp rhetoric focusing on the “axis of evil” and regime change, the United States has returned to the broad outlines of a deal adopted by the Clinton administration in 1994. It proposed a trade of a light-water nuclear reactor and energy and food aid for commitments from North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program and rejoin the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and accept inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The language that emerged from the talks Monday is woefully lacking in specifics. The most contentious issues are kicked down the road until the next round of talks in November. There’s no agreed-upon timeline and no moratorium on North Korea’s weapons program. And while there is discussion of suspending North Korea’s processing of plutonium for weapons, the country refused even to admit that it has a hidden uranium processing program.
Diplomacy is seldom a straight line, and dealing with the brutal and repressive North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il has been described as maddening. He kills his own people, allows them to starve and forces them into forced labor camps to maintain his grasp on power. His country is impoverished, and his ability to bargain for his continued survival relies upon his possession of nuclear weapons and the threat that he might supply the technology to others.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Assistant Secretary of State Chris Hill deserve credit for pushing the Bush administration to re-open talks and for navigating the process with China, Japan, South Korea and Russia. It’s also important to recognize the role China has taken as a broker in the talks. By demanding six-way talks, the Bush administration has spread the onus for an agreement, but it has also elevated the stature of competing regional powers, specifically China.
For more than a decade, talks and threats have failed to deliver a disarmed North Korea. After two years of talks, we’re back almost where we started in 1994, except now North Korea likely has nuclear weapons.
In the absence of something better, Monday’s agreement is a small step forward. But until we know for sure that North Korea has made the strategic decision to abandon its nuclear program, we’ll keep the cork in the champagne.
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