The controversy over Blackwater USA and other private security contractors in Iraq misses the mark. Instead of asking why these hired guns are permitted to behave recklessly, we should question why the government is using contractors – an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 – to help fight the Iraq war.

The answer to the first question is obvious. When ambushed by insurgents, the first instinct of those under attack is to shoot at anything that moves, including civilians. In such chaotic circumstances, it’s hard enough to impose restraint upon regular troops, let alone mercenaries, who, though often ex-military, are less likely to be well trained, disciplined, commanded or feel bound by rules of engagement.

The answer to the second question is considerably more complex. It strikes at the very heart of why the United States is in Iraq.

Using mercenaries is justified by the Pentagon on grounds they’re needed for missions uniformed soldiers don’t ordinarily perform – like operating dangerous supply convoys and protecting diplomatic personnel. But why suddenly use them in Iraq, when logistics have long been a core military function, and protection of our embassies and consulates around the world a duty of the Marines?

The reason is our military is stretched to the breaking point. Our strategic goals and commitments have outrun our available manpower and money. Indeed, those goals and commitments have begun to undermine the economic vitality they were designed to protect.

Historian Paul Kennedy, in his classic study “The Rise and Gall of the Great Powers,” stated, “If a state overextends itself strategically – by, say, the conquest of extensive territories or the waging of costly wars – it runs the risk that the potential benefits of external expansion may be outweighed by the great expense of it all.”

Great powers have employed mercenaries for thousands of years, particularly when their ambitions have outstripped their resources. Since mercenaries are motivated by pay, not patriotism, their reliability and loyalty cannot be counted upon. Their employment is itself symptomatic of their employer’s desperation.

Consider the Roman Empire, whose vaunted legions conquered the Mediterranean basin and most of Northern Europe 2,000 years ago. As Rome expanded, it supplemented its soldiers with mercenaries from barbarian tribes, called “auxiliaries,” to subdue and pacify the far reaches of the empire.

In 9 AD, one mercenary, a Germanic cavalry commander, Arminius, lured three Roman legions into an ambush by Germanic tribesmen and annihilated them in the Battle of Teutoburg Forest, one of Rome’s worst military disasters.

Also consider the German mercenaries, the Hessians, who fought for England during the American Revolution. In the 18th century, Great Britain lacked a large standing army to police its far-flung empire. Instead, it supplemented its own troops with mercenaries as the need arose. As a result, about one-quarter of the troops it dispatched to regain control over the rebellious American colonies were Hessians.

Although they distinguished themselves in the 1776 campaign to capture New York City, Hessians developed a reputation for cruel treatment of prisoners of war. Their hated presence was a propaganda bonanza for Gen. George Washington, whose defeat of a Hessian detachment at the Battle of Trenton, following his Christmas Day crossing of the Delaware River, became a rallying point for the dispirited Continental Army.

Stabilizing Iraq will probably require far more than the 140,000-plus U.S. troops now stationed there. Yet, substantially increasing force levels could impose great costs upon American taxpayers, resurrect the unpopular military draft and almost certainly create fierce public backlash.

Mercenaries are a temporary, though not inexpensive, expedient. Many security contractors earn upwards of $80,000 annually. According to one Congressional report, Blackwater charged the State Department $1,222 per guard per day to provide diplomatic security in Iraq, about six times the cost of an equivalent U.S. soldier. The advantage of renting soldiers is they don’t have to be recruited, trained, fed, clothed, armed or medically cared for at public expense, and they can be quickly dispensed with when no longer needed.

What, then, is our strategic goal for fighting a war in Iraq, and is it worth the cost?

In his recent controversial book, Alan Greenspan, former Federal Reserve Board chairman, became one of the few Washington insiders to publicly admit that the war was “largely about oil.” Started as a means of keeping the region’s petroleum safe from a ruthless Iraqi ruler with grandiose dreams of power, it has continued as an attempt to protect this vital resource from factional violence, religious extremism and Iranian hegemony.

The choice now for a great power like the U.S. is whether to continue to prosecute a protracted war that necessitates the assistance of mercenaries like Blackwater, or to re-calibrate its strategic goals and military commitments to obviate the need for war.

There were, and still are, alternatives to war. America could have embarked upon a sustained economic restructuring to lessen and eventually eliminate its heavy dependence on foreign oil. That, however, would have entailed higher gasoline pump prices, tax increases, stricter conservation measures and massive investments in renewable energy sources, causing temporary economic dislocation and domestic pain.

Waging war first against Iraq’s despised dictator and then against Al-Qaeda terrorists was an easier short-term political sell, but has proven a poorer long-term investment.

Elliott L. Epstein, a Lewiston attorney, is founder and board president of Museum L-A and an adjunct history instructor at Central Maine Community College. He can be reached at [email protected].