Russian military failures in Ukraine have raised the specter of nonconventional warfare. Some observers fear that Vladimir Putin may use the threat of nuclear force to get his way in Eastern Europe.

This comes just as we recognized the 60th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which should remind us of the opportunities and challenges of international détente.

The construction of Soviet missile bases less than 100 miles from U.S. soil sparked an unprecedented crisis. On Oct. 22, 1962, President John F. Kennedy ordered a general quarantine of Cuba, thus preventing the delivery of Soviet war materiel. He also issued a warning to Nikita Khrushchev, his counterpart in Russia, and appraised Americans of the gravity of the situation.

Although Kennedy’s public stance was uncompromising, we now know that de-escalation was the product of a quid pro quo: Khrushchev agreed to remove the missile facilities in Cuba while Kennedy ordered the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear warheads from Turkey.

Although we would hardly know it today, nuclear brinksmanship and the 1962 crisis laid the groundwork for détente — thanks to a magazine editor and the Roman pontiff.

Pope John XXIII issued a call for peace and dialogue at the height of the standoff. Felix Morlion, a Belgian priest then attending a conference in Massachusetts, had opened an indirect channel of communication between the Kennedy Administration and the Soviets; he helped steer discussions toward a papal statement that would be acceptable to all.

Presidential advisor Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., spied a larger opportunity. The Vatican might serve as a mediator in talks between the two superpowers. Norman Cousins, the Jewish editor of Saturday Review who had met Father Morlion, played an essential part in American shuttle diplomacy. After a White House meeting that established his agenda, Cousins flew to Europe on Dec. 1, 1962.

The Vatican had its own agenda. Ostensibly, Cousins was going to Moscow to plead for religious freedom and the release of jailed Catholic clergymen in Eastern Europe. But, as per his marching orders, Cousins also brought up the prospect of better East-West relations in his informal conversations with Khrushchev. There had been no official diplomatic exchanges between the two governments since the missile crisis. This covert back channel facilitated mutual understanding.

Mutual frustrations suspended the talks momentarily. Nevertheless, in February 1963, Cousins was back in Rome — and then in Russia again, discussing a possible nuclear test ban treaty. In the spring, when Pope John issued the encyclical Pacem in Terris and Kennedy publicly embraced it, the Christian Century remarked that “the pipeline from the Vatican to the White House has been opened.” In fact, thanks to Cousins, that relationship had been steadily growing for months.

Something else was unfolding unbeknownst to most Americans. Kennedy announced proposed de-escalation in a landmark address at American University in May 1963. He invited Americans to revisit their views of peace and of the Soviet Union. He stated, famously, “let us not be blind to our differences — but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved … in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children’s future. And we are all mortal.”

A test ban treaty was signed on July 25. Administration allies barnstormed for peace through the remainder of the summer. With the risks of nuclear annihilation still fresh in people’s minds, the draft treaty enjoyed broad support. Eighty senators voted for ratification in September 1963. They set a precedent in East-West dialogue, which echoed forward — all the way to a historic arms reduction agreement signed between Putin and President George W. Bush in 2002.

Communism is no longer an issue, and Putin has more American apologists than Khrushchev ever had. The shadow of the Cold War no less lingers thanks, in part, to Russian aggression in Chechnya, Georgia, Syria and Crimea. The sense of irreconcilable differences between the United States and Russia may be as deep as it was 60 years ago.

The ultimate lesson of the Cuban Missile Crisis in the present day is not to appease rogue countries or compromise on national security; Kennedy stood firm in the face of the Soviet threat.

But, as we think of a future beyond the war in Ukraine, we will have to seek out opportunities for a stable, enduring peace. This will require taking risks and daring to dialogue despite seemingly unsurmountable differences, all in the interest of “our most basic common link.”

Patrick Lacroix, Ph.D., is the author of “John F. Kennedy and the Politics of Faith.” He serves as director of the Acadian Archives in Fort Kent.

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